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Abstract. We solve a version of the analytical Real Business Cycle (RBC) model with
a predetermined rate of return on household saving. The solution differs from that of
the benchmark RBC model along two dimensions: (i) Policy functions depend on the
variance of the technology shock. (ii) There is a suboptimal pattern of excess saving.
We discuss the economic intuition underlying these properties. We also demonstrate
that unconditional welfare can be higher in the suboptimal model with predetermined
interest rates, providing a clear illustration of the pitfall with unconditional welfare
comparisons.
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1. Introduction
Following the landmark contributions from Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999,
BGG hereafter), Iacoviello (2005), or Gertler and Karadi (2011), dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) models with financial frictions often impose rates of return
for lenders that are predetermined and do not respond instantaneously to the aggre-
gate state of the economy. This assumption is usually introduced without much discus-
sion, suggesting that the literature views it as a benign premise. However, recent work
by Dmitriev and Hoddenbagh (2017) shows that it may be important, since removing
predetermined lending rates from the BGG model considerably weakens the financial
accelerator.
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In this note, we shed light on the implications of predetermined interest rates by
introducing them in a well-known framework: the Real Business Cycle (RBC) model.
To clarify the intuitions and avoid inaccuracies due to approximation techniques, we
study the model under conditions that guarantee a closed-form solution (log utility on
consumption, Cobb-Douglas technology, and full capital depreciation).
We find that predetermined rates affect the model equilibrium along two dimensions.
First, the policy functions in the economy with predetermined rates depend on the
variance of the technology shock. We provide a condition for a bounded solution to
exist. In contrast, policy functions do not depend on the shock variance in the standard
RBC model.
Second, the saving rate is higher in the economy with predetermined rates than in the
RBC model. Since the latter features an efficient allocation, we conclude that predeter-
mined lending rates are associated with inefficient over-saving. We appeal to standard
results from finance theory to interpret this association. Intuitively, the return to capital
covaries positively with consumption in the RBC model, which destabilizes the con-
sumption path and makes saving less attractive for risk-averse households. On the other
hand, rates of return are not correlated with future consumption when they are prede-
termined, so that households have a larger incentive to save. Importantly, over-saving
does not occur because of precautionary behavior in the environment with predetermined
rates, since saving decisions are risk free.
Finally, we demonstrate that unconditional (average) welfare can be higher in the
model with predetermined rates than in the RBC economy, depending on the variance
of the shock. Since the RBC equilibrium is a Pareto optimum, our analytical framework
illustrates in a transparent fashion the pitfall with unconditional welfare comparisons
when the social utility function includes time discounting.1
2. The Models
In this section, we review the standard RBC model and introduce an alternative
economy with predetermined interest rates. The two models differ only in the timing of
events in the capital market. Indeed, while the rate of return on current saving must be
forecast in the RBC model, we assume that institutions require the firm to promise a
known rate of return in the alternative economy.
2.1. The RBC model. We consider a decentralized economy with a representative
household and a representative firm.
1See, e.g., Kim, Kim, Schaumburg, and Sims (2008) and Kim and Kim (2018) for discussions of
unconditional welfare comparisons.
PREDETERMINED INTEREST RATES 3
The representative household has preferences given by E0
∑∞
t=0 β
t ln(ct), where E0
is the expectation operator conditional on date-0 information, β ∈ [0, 1[ is the dis-
count factor, and ct denotes consumption. At each period, the household receives in-
come from past saving and corporate profits pit, and allocates expenditures between
consumption and capital kt. With full capital depreciation, the budget constraint veri-
fies ct + kt = r
k
t kt−1 + pit, where r
k
t denotes the state-contingent return on capital. At
each period, the optimal consumption-saving plan is characterized by the Euler equation
1 = βEt
(
rkt+1ct/ct+1
)
.
At date t, the representative firm uses the kt−1 available units of capital to produce
the final good in quantity yt = tk
α
t−1, where α ∈]0, 1[ and t is a stochastic technology
process evolving according to t = 
ρ
t−1 exp(ut), with ρ ∈ [0, 1[, ut ∼ N(0, σ2), and σ ≥ 0.
Corporate profits are given by pit = tk
α
t−1 − rkt kt−1 and the optimal production plan
verifies αtk
α−1
t−1 = r
k
t .
Finally, the aggregate resource constraint is ct + kt = tk
α
t−1.
After rearranging, the equilibrium system becomes
1/ct = αβEt
(
t+1k
α−1
t /ct+1
)
,
ct + kt = tk
α
t−1,
t = 
ρ
t−1 exp(ut).
(1)
As is well known (McCallum, 1988), System (1) admits an exact solution.
Proposition 1. The analytical RBC model (1) has the closed-form solution
(RBC)

t = 
ρ
t−1 exp(ut),
kt = αβtk
α
t−1,
ct = (1− αβ)tkαt−1.
2.2. The model with predetermined interest rates. The alternative model is iden-
tical to the RBC economy, with two exceptions. First, we assume that the firm needs to
borrow capital from the household at date t in order to produce at date t + 1. Second,
the firm and the household cannot write state-contingent contracts, so that the return
to capital has to be predetermined with respect to the state of the economy. These
two assumptions can be interpreted as reflecting unmodeled institutional frictions, for
instance arising from financial intermediation.2
In this alternative model, the household’s budget constraint becomes ct + kt = (1 +
rdt−1)kt−1 + pit, where r
d
t−1 is the predetermined return on capital. The implied Euler
2As we emphasized in the introduction, DSGE models with financial intermediation typically embed
predetermined rates of return on household saving. Additional examples include Gerali, Neri, Sessa,
and Signoretti (2010), Kollmann, Enders, and Mu¨ller (2011), and Iacoviello (2015).
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equation is then 1 = β(1+rdt )Et (ct/ct+1). Notice how our alternative timing assumption
allows us to extract the rate of return from the conditional expectation.
On the firm’s side, the profit-maximizing problem becomes dynamic as the cost of next
period’s capital is fixed at date t. The expected profit function is Etpit+1 = Ett+1k
α
t −
(1 + rdt )kt and the optimality condition implies r
d
t = αEt
(
t+1k
α−1
t
)− 1.3
After rearranging, the equilibrium system becomes
1/ct = αβEt
(
t+1k
α−1
t
)
Et (1/ct+1) ,
ct + kt = tk
α
t−1,
t = 
ρ
t−1 exp(ut).
(2)
System (2) is very similar to System (1). The only difference lies in the Euler equation:
the return to capital and the marginal utility of consumption at date t + 1 now appear
within separate expectation operators, which is not the case in the RBC model. As we
show next, this is sufficient to significantly alter the properties of the economy. Under
an additional assumption, System (2) also admits an exact solution.
Assumption 1. σ2 < − ln(αβ).
Proposition 2. Under Assumption 1, the model with predetermined interest rates (2)
has the closed-form solution
(PRED)

t = 
ρ
t−1 exp(ut),
kt = αβntk
α
t−1,
ct = (1− αβn)tkαt−1,
where n = exp(σ2) ≥ 1.
Proof. Using the properties of log-normal distributions, we rewrite the Euler equation in
System (2) as
kt
ct
= αβ exp(σ2/2)Et
ρtk
α
t
ct+1
= αβ exp(σ2/2)Et
t+1k
α
t
exp(ut+1)ct+1
= αβ exp(σ2/2)Et
ct+1 + kt+1
exp(ut+1)ct+1
= αβ exp(σ2) + αβ exp(σ2/2)Et
kt+1
exp(ut+1)ct+1
.
Iterating forward gives
kt
ct
= γ + γ2 + γ3 + . . . + γi +
[
αβ exp(σ2/2)
]i
Et
kt+i/ct+i∏i
j=1 exp(ut+j)
, i ≥ 1,
with γ = αβn and n = exp(σ2). It is straightforward to show that when γ < 1, the
above expression converges to the solution in Proposition 2. On the other hand, when
3Risk-neutral pricing from the firm is required for predetermined interest rates to matter in general
equilibrium. This can be micro-founded through an heterogeneous-agent setup. We thank Mikhail
Dmitriev for raising this point.
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γ ≥ 1, the series diverges and the economy collapses as optimal consumption reaches
zero. Assumption 1 rules out this possibility. 
The proposition shows that the model with predetermined rates differs from the RBC
benchmark along three dimensions. First, the policy functions in Economy (PRED)
depend on the variance of the technology shock through the term n ≥ 1. This is not the
case in the RBC model. Second, the policy functions are only defined if the shocks are
sufficiently small, in the sense of Assumption 1. This is reminiscent of results by Burnside
(1998) or Collard, Fe`ve, and Ghattassi (2006) showing that restrictions on the volatility
of shocks may be necessary for a bounded equilibrium to exist when households are risk
averse. Third, the saving rate is higher in Economy (PRED). In the next section, we
elaborate on the economic intuition underlying these differences.
3. Applications
In this section, we use our analytical framework to make two points. First, we explain
the pattern of over-saving in presence of predetermined interest rates by building on
standard results from asset pricing. Second, we demonstrate that unconditional welfare
can be higher in the model with predetermined interest rates than in the RBC economy,
in spite of the RBC allocation being a Pareto optimum.
3.1. Predetermined rates and over-saving. As shown in Solution (PRED), the
saving rate is higher in the economy with a predetermined rate of return than in the
RBC model. The saving rate is also strictly increasing in the variance of the technology
shock σ2. This relationship appears to suggest a precautionary saving motive, but this
is not the case since investment is risk free in the environment with predetermined rates.
We actually show that the opposite is true: over-saving occurs because the return to
investment is safe.
The intuition is best captured by comparing the marginal returns to saving in utility
terms across the two models. From the Euler equations, we see that the marginal return
to saving in utils is given by Etrk,t+1/ct+1 in Model (RBC) and by Et(rk,t+1)Et(1/ct+1)
in Model (PRED). Using the covariance identity, we can also write the return in
the RBC model as Covt(rk,t+1, 1/ct+1) + Et(rk,t+1)Et(1/ct+1). It is easy to spot that
Covt(rk,t+1, 1/ct+1) < 0 since the technology shock moves rk,t+1 and ct+1 in the same
direction. It follows immediately that, along a given (ct, kt, t) path, the return to saving
is smaller in Model (RBC) than in Model (PRED). This explains why the saving rate
is higher in the model with predetermined interest rates.
Note that our argument only relies on the representative household being risk averse,
since the marginal utility of consumption of a risk-neutral investor would be a constant
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that does not covary with the return to capital. On the other hand, we do not need the
specific assumptions of log utility and full capital depreciation, which only appear for
analytical convenience: with a CRRA utility function and incomplete depreciation, our
argument would still imply that the return to saving in utils is larger with predetermined
rates. Hence, we expect predetermined rates to generate over-saving in more general
setups.4
Our previous discussion is a direct transposition of a standard result from the the-
ory of consumption-based asset pricing.5 In its most frequent form, the result states
that risk-averse investors prefer assets whose payoffs are negatively correlated with con-
sumption growth, since they help smoothing consumption over time. The same logic
applies here: while the return to capital is positively correlated with future consumption
in Model (RBC), the predetermined rate of return on saving is uncorrelated with it in
Model (PRED), which makes saving and investment more desirable for the risk-averse
household. The argument also explains why the saving rate is increasing with σ, since
the hedge provided by the predetermined return is more valuable in a volatile economy.
3.2. A pitfall with unconditional welfare comparison. We now compare welfare
across the Models (RBC) and (PRED). Since allocations are optimal in the RBC model,
we expect over-saving to be detrimental for welfare in the economy with predetermined
interest rates. We show below that, while a measure of welfare that conditions on
the state vector confirms this intuition, an unconditional metric finds higher welfare in
Model (PRED).
We start by computing conditional welfare measures. Given a state vector (t, kt−1),
conditional welfare in economy i ∈ {RBC,PRED} is just the value function of the
representative household: Wci (t, kt−1) = Et
∑∞
j=0 β
j ln(ci,t+j). Note that WcRBC is the
social planner’s objective function in the centralized version of the RBC economy. More
generally, conditional welfare comparisons allow one to evaluate the models on equal
footing by controlling for potential differences in long-run averages through a common
initial condition.
Using the analytical solutions from Propositions 1 and 2, straightforward algebra leads
to
WcRBC(, k) =
ln (1− αβ)
1− β +
αβ ln (αβ)
(1− αβ) (1− β) +
ln ()
(1− αβ) (1− βρ) +
α ln (k)
1− αβ
4Indeed, our conclusions also hold in a 2-period model with CRRA utility and incomplete depreciation.
5See, e.g., Cochrane (2009, Chapter 1.4) for an excellent treatment.
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and
WcPRED(, k) =
ln (1− αβn)
1− β +
αβ ln (αβn)
(1− αβ) (1− β) +
ln ()
(1− αβ) (1− βρ) +
α ln (k)
1− αβ
= WcRBC(, k) +
ln
(
1−αβn
1−αβ
)
1− β +
αβ ln (n)
(1− αβ) (1− β) .
Thus conditional welfare does not depend on volatility in Model (RBC), but does in
Model (PRED) through the term n. Moreover, since WcRBC = WcPRED when σ = 0
and ∂WcPRED/∂σ ≤ 0, conditional welfare is higher in the RBC economy when there
is uncertainty. Since allocations maximize WcRBC(, k) in the RBC economy, this is an
expected result.
We now turn to unconditional welfare, defined as the average value function of the
representative household, Wui = EWci (t, kt−1). Lester, Pries, and Sims (2014) argue
that this unconditional metric is better than the conditional measure at capturing welfare
differences in the long run, once the effects of initial conditions have vanished.
Since Models (RBC) and (PRED) are both log-linear, simple computations reveal
that
WuRBC =
(1− α) ln(1− αβ) + α ln(αβ)
(1− α)(1− β)
WuPRED =
(1− α) ln(1− αβn) + α ln(αβn)
(1− α)(1− β) .
It is straightforward to confirm that WuRBC = WuPRED when σ = 0. In addition,
∂WuPRED/∂σ > 0 when n < 1/β, ∂WuPRED/∂σ < 0 when n > 1/β, and WuPRED → −∞
when n→ − ln(αβ). Therefore, unconditional welfare is higher in Model (PRED) than
in Model (RBC) when shocks are relatively small.
This is a surprising result since the RBC allocation is efficient and preferred for any
given state vector, or equivalently at any given point in time. The underlying logic is
very close to the difference between the golden rule and the modified golden rule in the
standard growth model.6 Intuitively, the representative household is indifferent between
consuming more today or tomorrow at the RBC equilibrium. Moving to Model (PRED)
implies higher saving today and more consumption in the long run, so that current
consumption has to fall. This has to be detrimental for welfare if the agent is impatient,
but the unconditional criterion neglects this transition effect by focusing only on long-run
outcomes.
6See Kim and Kim (2018) for a discussion of the role of time preferences when comparing conditional
and unconditional welfare.
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4. Conclusion
In this note, we solve an analytical Real Business Cycle (RBC) model with a prede-
termined rate of return on household saving. We demonstrate that equilibrium policy
functions depend on the variance of the technology shock and that there is a suboptimal
pattern of excess saving compared to the baseline model. We explain these properties
using arguments from the theory of asset pricing. Our analytical framework also provides
a clear illustration of the pitfall with unconditional welfare comparisons.
References
Bernanke, B. S., M. Gertler, and S. Gilchrist (1999): “The Financial Acceler-
ator in a Quantitative Business Cycle Framework,” in Handbook of Macroeconomics,
ed. by J. B. Taylor, and M. Woodford, vol. 1 of Handbook of Macroeconomics, chap. 21,
pp. 1341–1393. Elsevier.
Burnside, C. (1998): “Solving Asset Pricing Models with Gaussian Shocks,” Journal
of Economic Dynamics and Control, 22(3), 329–340.
Cochrane, J. (2009): Asset Pricing: Revised Edition. Princeton University Press.
Collard, F., P. Fe`ve, and I. Ghattassi (2006): “Predictability and Habit Persis-
tence,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 30(11), 2217–2260.
Dmitriev, M., and J. Hoddenbagh (2017): “The Financial Accelerator and the
Optimal State-Dependent Contract,” Review of Economic Dynamics, 24, 43–65.
Gerali, A., S. Neri, L. Sessa, and F. M. Signoretti (2010): “Credit and Banking
in a DSGE Model of the Euro Area,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 42(s1),
107–141.
Gertler, M., and P. Karadi (2011): “A Model of Unconventional Monetary Policy,”
Journal of Monetary Economics, 58(1), 17–34.
Iacoviello, M. (2005): “House Prices, Borrowing Constraints, and Monetary Policy
in the Business Cycle,” American Economic Review, 95(3), 739–764.
(2015): “Financial Business Cycles,” Review of Economic Dynamics, 18(1),
140–164.
Kim, J., and S. Kim (2018): “Conditional Versus Unconditional Utility as Welfare
Criterion: Two Examples,” Computational Economics, 51(3), 719–730.
Kim, J., S. Kim, E. Schaumburg, and C. A. Sims (2008): “Calculating and Using
Second-Order Accurate Solutions of Discrete Time Dynamic Equilibrium Models,”
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 32(11), 3397–3414.
Kollmann, R., Z. Enders, and G. J. Mu¨ller (2011): “Global Banking and Inter-
national Business Cycles,” European Economic Review, 55(3), 407–426.
PREDETERMINED INTEREST RATES 9
Lester, R., M. Pries, and E. Sims (2014): “Volatility and Welfare,” Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control, 38(C), 17–36.
McCallum, B. T. (1988): “Real Business Cycle Models,” NBER Working Papers
2480, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
